Liberal turn in media policy : the case of Finland's digital television by Hellman, Heikki
1 
Liberal Turn in Media Policy: 
The Case of Finland’s Digital Television 
Heikki Hellman 
University of Tampere 
ABSTRACT:  
According to the influential typology by Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini, Finland’s media 
system follows the democratic corporatist model, rather than the polarized plural or the 
liberal model. The article analyses digitalization of television in Finland and, in particular, 
its licensing policy as an example of convergence of national media systems towards the 
liberal model. Using original media policy documents and recent research on programme 
structures, the analysis reveals that, with multiplied channel capacity, increasing 
‘consumer choice’ became an end in itself in the Finnish media policy since the mid-1990s. 
As this is associated with licensing an ever growing number of commercially targeted and 
formatted channels competing for popularity among mainstream market segments, the 
shift from the earlier public service protectionism to an increased market role indicates a 
change in Finland’s media policy paradigm. Instead of providing more alternatives in terms 
of content, digitalization in Finland only gave viewers greater quantity and, in effect, 
accelerated a dramatic marketization of broadcasting. 
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According to the influential classification by Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini, Finland’s 
media system follows a structure typical of North and Central European countries, the 
democratic corporatist model, as opposed to the liberal model, typical of the United 
Kingdom and the United States, or the polarized plural model, typical of the Mediterranean 
countries such as France, Spain and Italy. The North European model is characterized by, 
for example, high external pluralism of the press, high newspaper circulation and high 
journalistic professionalism. Typical of democratic corporatism is a strong emphasis on the 
role of organized interest groups and, at the same time, a strong sense of commitment to 
the ‘common good’. Another ‘conflicting’ co-existence is the strong value placed on media 
autonomy while state intervention in the media is extensive. (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 74-
75, 144-45). In countries in which the democratic corporatist model prevails public 
broadcasters are typically strong, well-funded and governed by political forces, whereas 
commercial broadcasting is strictly regulated. As the authors put it, broadcasting in these 
countries is treated ‘as an institution whose influence on society is too great to be left 
under the control of private interests and that must be run under the authority of the state 
as a representative of the general interest’ (2004: 164). 
However, the three models typical of Western democracies appear to be converging, with 
the liberal model becoming increasingly triumphant. According to Hallin and Mancini, a 
single, global media model is displacing the national variation of the past, with 
commercialization being the most powerful force for homogenization of media systems. 
The ‘commercial deluge’ of broadcasting and multiplication of channels in the 1980s and 
1990s, in particular, contributed to a transition in the perception of broadcast programming, 
which ‘came to seem less like a social institution, a public good provided for and shared by 
everyone in society, and more like a commodity that could be chosen by individual 
consumers’ (2004: 275). 
Instead of commercialization, this force is named here marketization, which we find a more 
general concept. It refers to the fact that Western societies have become increasingly 
market-driven and the idea of the market as a ‘natural’ basis for all social action has 
become a dominant ideology. Accordingly, media are seen as markets, their audiences as 
consumers, and communications technology as a means to economic growth (cf. Rolland, 
2008: 127-28). Drawing from Hallin’s and Mancini’s analysis, our argument is that 
marketization is not only transforming the media scene towards the liberal, commercial 
system but that, at the same time, it changes fundamentally media policy thinking in 
individual countries.   
Our case study focuses on the digitalization of television broadcasting in Finland. The 
principal decision about this major technological leap was made by the Finnish 
government in spring 1996 and the first digital terrestrial channels were launched in 
autumn 2001. The final switch-off of all Finnish analogue television, including cable, took 
place in February 2008, earlier than in any other country in Europe (cf. Iosifidis, 2006). By 
analyzing original media policy documents, the article shows that Finland employed the 
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digital conversion and the increased channel capacity as an excuse for the marketization 
of its television sector. In particular, we focus on the licensing decisions of digital terrestrial 
television (DTT) in order to indicate that the digitalization served as an argument for a new, 
liberalized media policy paradigm, promoting ‘consumer choice’ as an end in itself. On 
basis of the analysis of the four licensing rounds it is suggested that, while digitalization did 
manage to increase competition in television broadcasting, it also consolidated existing 
oligopolies, whereas a second goal, increasing programme diversity and providing a 
‘television of plenty’ to all Finns, was met only partially. In practice, digital television (DTV) 
did not provide more alternatives in terms of content but, rather, more choice in terms of 
quantity, as the licensing process resulted in a surge of commercially formatted channels 
competing for popularity among mainstream market segments and in a downward trend in 
the horizontal diversity of television offerings. 
 
Democratic corporatism vs. the new media policy paradigm 
Pragmatism meets protectionism 
Up until the 1990s, electronic communications were heavily protected in Finland. The 
state-owned broadcasting company Oy Yleisradio Ab (YLE) had a monopoly of radio 
broadcasts till 1985 and television broadcasts till 1993. Broadcasting was conceived as a 
general interest public service, providing equal services at equal price to all Finns all over 
Finland. The broadcasting sector constituted a protectorate which was justified with 
technical, cultural and commercial reasons. Accordingly, broadcasting licences were not 
granted to any other parties (though there was a short period from 1956 to 1964 when a 
private foundation for the promotion of technology, Tekniikan Edistämissäätiö with its TES-
TV, was allowed to provide television services in three major urban regions but YLE 
acquired its assets in 1964, thus laying the cornerstone of its TV2). 
However, in one respect Finland was an exception. The public broadcaster YLE had 
already since 1957 a commercial companion, Oy Mainos-TV-Reklam Ab (later MTV Oy). 
MTV rented air-time on YLE’s two channels (TV1 and TV2), thus providing a considerable 
share of programming and another major funding base for YLE, in addition to the licence 
fee. This unorthodox companionship and the shared channel system have been described 
as an economically pragmatic and politically protected strategic alliance (Hellman, 1999; 
Salokangas, 1996; see, also, Noam, 1991). This reminds us that the media systems, as 
classified by Hallin and Mancini (2004), are not internally homogenous. Typical of the 
democratic corporatist model, according to them, are a strong commitment of the state to 
the institution of public service broadcasting, relatively late introduction of commercial 
broadcasting and purity of public broadcasting systems. In the case of Finland, two of 
these three aspects do not fit the model (see, also, Jääsaari, 2007: 126). 
Finnish broadcasting policy was traditionally dominated by four basic principles: (1) 
structural regulation of the market combined with (2) economic pragmatism, (3) political 
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compromise and (4) cultural protectionism (cf. Aslama et al., 2004b; Hellman, 1999; 
Jääsaari, 2007). Structural control meant that regulation concentrated on media structure 
rather than media content. It was YLE whose interests were always safeguarded in the 
first place, whereas market entry was heavily restricted. Pragmatism meant economic 
arrangements that would best secure the viability of television in a small market. Political 
compromises were needed to safeguard the ‘social partnership’ not only between the two 
companies but also between relevant interest groups and political parties for the 
governance of the media. Finally, cultural protectionism materialized in favouring domestic 
culture against the threat of imported cultural influences.  
High state interventionism in broadcasting is typical of democratic corporatist countries, in 
particular if they are small in size (Puppis, 2009: 14) but, in the case of Finland, a sparsely 
populated country with five million inhabitants, state interference was restricted to the 
privileged role of the public broadcaster and the government’s rigid licensing policy. 
Commercialism was accepted but only in a ‘domesticated’ form, i.e. under the supervision 
of YLE. On the other hand, no restrictions on media cross-ownership were ever imposed 
since they were regarded as a threat to consolidating the domestic media industry, rather 
than as a protection against media concentration (Hellman, 1999; Jääsaari, 2007).  
 
Liberalization of regulation 
By the 1990s much of the traditional justification of YLE’s de facto monopoly had become 
obsolete. The technical reason, scarcity of airwaves, was eased by cable and satellite 
transmission. The commercial reason, lack of money and the small size of the market, was 
also questioned since advertising was booming. Finally, the principle of protecting national 
culture had also become hollow, since the audience could anyway receive international 
channels via cable and satellite.  
 
In the new situation, the regulation of broadcasting was liberalized and commercial 
operators were allowed to enter the market. The first concession to marketization was 
Kolmostelevisio (Channel Three), a commercial joint venture of YLE, MTV and Nokia, 
launched in 1986 and operating under YLE’s licence. A second step was taken in 1993 
when MTV was, finally, separated from YLE’s regulation and was granted a licence of its 
own. The company also purchased the operations of the third channel, now re-named as 
MTV3, and started to compete with its previous companion. Liberalization continued in 
1997 with the launch of Nelonen (Channel Four), operated by Ruutunelonen Oy, a 
company owned by Sanoma Corporation, Finland’s major newspaper publisher. However, 
the most important step taken was the decision in principle by the Finnish government in 
May 1996 to digitalize television transmission altogether and to open up the market for 
new entrants. 
 
Of course, these shifts were not only a Finnish phenomenon but reflected a general 
transition from ‘planned economy’ to ‘competition economy’ (Alasuutari, 2004). 
Marketization of the media sector took place all over Europe, and emphasis was 
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increasingly put on the media as markets and their audiences as consumers. According to 
Murdock (2004: 30), operating space allocated to business enterprise was enlarged and 
sectors conceived earlier as ‘public good’ were redefined as open markets while all these 
shifts were legitimised by market rhetoric and a new master ideology of consumerism.  
As regards the impact of marketization on regulatory regimes, van Cuilenburg and 
McQuail (2003) have named this change as a media policy paradigm shift, with the 
emerging policy being mainly driven by economic, technical and consumerist values, 
instead of the social, political and cultural rhetoric, typical of the earlier paradigm. In 
Hallin’s and Mancini’s (2004) framework, this means that the role of the electronic media 
comes to be seen less in terms of representation of social groups and ideological diversity 
than in terms of providing information to citizen-consumers. This transition also changes 
the perception of the state interference in media policy. State interventionism, including 
public service broadcasting and licence fees, becomes increasingly questionable, and 
regulatory bodies tend to become separated from party politics and managed by neutral 
professionals. From the Finnish perspective, Nieminen and Pantti (2004) have identified 
this tendency as a switchover from cultural/moral regulation to economic/commercial 
regulation. According to Jääsaari, the state in Finland now serves more as a ‘promoter or 
referee instead of regulator’ while, at the same time, ‘emphasis shifted from the protection 
of national radio and television as distinct media forms to the promotion of competition and 
the market mechanism within the communications in general’ (Jääsaari, 2007: 97). 
Guidelines of this new policy were mainly set by a ‘one-man task-force’ by Jouni 
Mykkänen, a former YLE deputy managing director. In his 1995 report, commissioned by 
the Ministry of Transport (which later became the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications, MOTC), Mr Mykkänen suggested a ‘balancing’ communications policy 
which, on the one hand, would safeguard YLE’s status but, on the other, would actively 
liberalize the sector by granting new operating licences. The future of regulation was 
sketched as follows: 
The role of the state as a regulator will be reshaped. Instead of a controlling 
duty, a positive regulation, an enabling influence on the structures of 
programme production, will be emphasized. (Mykkänen, 1995: 17) 
According to Mykkänen, regulation of the liberalized market would focus on preventing the 
emergence of monopolies and applying standard competition rules. Instead of detailed 
decrees on programming, he suggested that only the general lines of programme supply 
should be defined and that the principal criterion for granting licences would be an 
assessment of candidates’ capability of sustainable operation. Providing new programme 
alternatives, too, was mentioned as one of the policy goals (1995: 29-36). 
The new policy paradigm was, then, documented in two pieces of legislation, the Act on 
Television and Radio Operations (1998) and the Communications Market Act (2003), of 
which the earlier, in particular, is essential since it defines the regulatory mandates of 
authorities, the rules of the licensing policy and the general regulations for broadcasters. 
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As earlier, operating licences are granted by the Council of State (COS), i.e. Finland’s 
cabinet, while the decisions are drafted by the MOTC and a separate body, 
Viestintävirasto (Finnish Communications Regulation Authority, Ficora), is in charge of the 
supervision of broadcasters. Licensing is based on a ‘beauty contest’, in which – as Mr 
Mykkänen suggested – the bottom line is not the superiority of programming but the 
reliability of the candidate. The licensing authority is primarily expected to take into 
consideration that ‘concentration of communication sector will not increase in a manner 
which would endanger freedom of speech’ and that a licence can be granted only to ‘an 
applicant with an adequate financial standing’ and ‘sufficient resources to maintain regular 
operations’ (Parliament, 1998: 31-32). 
Although granted already before the new legislation, in 1996, the licence of Nelonen was 
the first manifestation of the new policy aiming explicitly at increasing competition in 
television broadcasting. Later, liberalization of the market was promoted by relaxing the 
obligations of commercial broadcasters. For example, while the analogue operating 
licence of MTV3 stipulated that the channel should provide ‘programming both in Finnish 
and Swedish’, since Finland is a bilingual country with a five percent Swedish-speaking 
minority (COS, 1999a), this obligation was dropped from its digital licence (COS, 1999b). 
The duty to broadcast ‘a sufficient amount of domestic programmes’ was another 
requirement cancelled in 1999 (Hellman, 1999: 172-75; Jääsaari, 2007: 95-96). In 
accordance with the policy guidelines suggested by Mr Mykkänen, all programming 
requirements for commercial channels have been kept at a very general level, with public 
service duties being imposed only on YLE. For example, diversity of programming is 
imposed as a general goal only for those channels that have a general interest profile, but 
no detailed requirements are established. YLE does not require a licence at all since it 
operates under a separate law, Act on Yleisradio (1993), defining its public service 
provision. 
Reflecting the emerging liberal ethos, the MOTC has been very pragmatic about 
ownership changes of television channels. For example, when MTV Oy, in 1997, merged 
with the Aamulehti Group, a major newspaper publisher, in order to establish Alma Media 
Group, the MOTC welcomed the transaction as a clarification of the media industry 
(Hellman, 1999: 154). Similarly, when MTV, in 2005, became part of Nordic Broadcasting, 
a holding company owned by the Swedish Bonnier and Proventus Industrier, or when 
Urheilukanava, in 2007, became an affiliate of Sanoma/Swelcom, the Finnish government 
did not hesitate in maintaining their licences, in spite of the legal decree that a significant 
change in ownership may result in the licence becoming extinct (Act on Television and 
Radio Operations, 1998: Section 12). These examples indicate that structural policy and 
pragmatism, i.e. aiming to consolidate the industry and safeguard its profitability, still 
dominate Finland’s media policy. They also bring to mind the suggestion by Puppis (2009: 
14) that an exclusive language, such as Finnish, may enable small states to choose a 
lower level of state-interventionism and protectionism than countries with giant neighbours 
and a shared language.  
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The interests of the private media firms were favoured also when the operating licence 
fees, collected in order to finance YLE and amounting to some 15 per cent of YLE’s 
turnover, were halved in 2002 and totally abolished in 2007. The abolition of the fee 
dampened down the criticism of the media firms, claiming that YLE was competing against 
them with their money, but did not silence the continuous attacks by the industry lobby 
against the ‘full service’ remit and ‘too generous’ funding of the company, accusing it of 
‘market distortion’ and requiring that it should focus on its ‘core public service task’ only 
(see, e.g., Finnmedia, 2009).  
Another front where YLE was being disarmed was its earlier monopoly in broadcasting 
transmission. In 1999, YLE was forced to create a separate company for its network 
transmission activities, providing services for all broadcasters. Although not originally 
planned, YLE eventually privatized the company, i.e. sold it to Telediffusion de France 
(TDF), in order to finance the costs of digital conversion (see, e.g., Brown, 2005: 229; 
Jääsaari, 2007: 113-14). Also, the governance of YLE has been made more businesslike 
by introducing, in 2005, an external board, composed of experts. At the same time, the 
politically elected Administrative Council, mainly composed of politicians, has been subject 
to an aggressive lobbying campaign of the media industry, which has required the 
replacement of the ‘politicized’ council by an expert supervisory body imitating the model 
of the BBC Trust in Britain (see, e.g., Finnmedia, 2009). 
During the first decade of the 2000s alone, three parliamentary or other expert working 
groups, appointed by the MOTC, have assessed the need to redefine YLE’s duties and its 
funding. In spite of the political controversy, new legislation, grounded on the latest report 
(see, Lintilä, 2009), will be drafted in 2010. It is expected mildly to reform the provision and 
supervision of the public broadcaster and substitute a general media tax for the licence fee 
paid by viewers. 
 
Digitalization and marketization 
In fact, the policy measures taken since the mid-1990s fit well with the description of Hallin 
and Mancini (2004) or Puppis (2009) about the emergence of liberalist, market-based 
approach on media regulation. Entry barriers for private media companies have been 
removed and obligations relieved while efforts to ‘depoliticize’ the public broadcaster have 
been made. In her analysis of consistencies and changes in Finnish broadcasting policy, 
Jääsaari lists several continuities, such as YLE’s privileged status, but she also describes 
a major transformation. According to her, the new broadcasting policy paradigm emerged 
gradually in three aspects (2007: 172-75): 
1. In regulation, a shift in balance took place between private and public interest in 
favour of the first. The position of commercial television was strengthened by 
opening up the market and a gradual relaxation of regulation. 
2. An increasing tendency was to refer to the norms and rules of the market in 
determining what is considered appropriate and reasonable. Public-service oriented 
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frames were marginalized and the importance of sustaining culture, education, 
equality, etc. became increasingly seen as responsibilities that concerned only YLE. 
3. The operating environment of Finnish broadcasting was re-conceptualized in terms 
of market-steering rather than state intervention. ‘Consumer choice’ in the creation 
of services was promoted as an overarching frame. 
 
Similar to our argument, Jääsaari claims that digitalization, in particular, came to represent 
‘a specific program in a realigned policy paradigm where the efficient working of 
communications markets was the main goal’ (2007: 114; emphasis omitted). In other 
words, digitalization was a means of marketizing the Finnish broadcasting sector.  
This redefined broadcasting policy paradigm does not appear to displace the traditional 
four principles of the earlier paradigm, i.e. structural regulation, economic pragmatism, 
political compromising and cultural protectionism. Rather, it only added the term of 
marketization to them. The new policy aims at managed liberalization of the broadcasting 
sector, or a moderate increase in competition, whereas pragmatism and political 
compromise are needed to safeguard the business interests and viability of not only YLE 
but of the commercial media sector, too, including telephone operators and newspaper 
publishers. Cultural protectionism came increasingly to mean keeping the business in 
domestic hands instead of those of international media conglomerates.  
Since Jääsaari analyses digitalization at a very general level of broadcasting policy, many 
questions remain unanswered. How did the licensing decisions promote marketization in 
practice? What kinds of market-based arguments were applied when granting licences? 
Furthermore, how did marketization materialise in television programming?  
 
Diversity in licensing policy 
Dimensions of diversity 
Diversity refers both to plurality of sources (channels) and plurality of content (Freedman, 
2005; Hellman, 2001; Napoli, 1999). Often, these two dimensions are confused, not only in 
everyday speech but also in media policy where diversity has become an end in itself 
although the exact meaning of the word may remain vague and blurry. 
In market-based thinking, diversity of television is usually connected with the number of 
alternatives. The more choice (channels, programmes) and the more diverse products 
(channel types, programme types) in the choice-set, the greater diversity is available to the 
consumer. In the market model diversity refers not so much to what distinguishes one 
choice from another but to the size of the menu as a whole. Here diversity serves as a 
consumerist construction that highlights the act of individual selection. The better the 
demands of various target groups or market segments are met, the greater the diversity 
(Freedman, 2005: 17-19; Hellman, 2001: 182-83; Karppinen, 2006: 56-58). 
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In the public service tradition, diversity is not based on pleasing the audience segments or 
meeting the demand but is, rather, a normative measure of quality, a deliberate policy goal 
which aims at ‘principal pluralism’ at several levels: first, reflecting and giving equal access 
to the various social groups and even minorities; second, serving the needs of the multiple 
publics; and, third, offering a wide range in programme content, not only in terms of 
programme types but, also, geographically, linguistically, socially, politically, culturally, etc. 
(Hellman, 2001: 183; Karppinen, 2006: 56-58; cf. McQuail, 1992: 132-45).   
What has happened along with the marketization of television is that ‘market speech’ has 
seized diversity and started to use it for its own purposes. Increasingly, diversity is 
conceptualized as a widest possible choice of products and services. In accordance with 
the new orthodoxy, consumer choice has become a favourite catchphrase in broadcasting 
policy and, as Jääsaari (2007: 107) notices, concepts like ‘service’, ‘content’, ‘consumer’ 
and ‘user’ have replaced ‘channels’, ‘programmes’, ‘viewers’ and ‘citizens’. At the same 
time, two different goals, plurality of sources and diversity of content, appear to have 
converged around the master rhetoric of competition and choice (Freedman, 2005: 19).  
 
Programming requirements and licensing 
Although we have claimed that programme content is not the bottom line when granting 
licences for broadcasting in Finland, programming does play a role here. When the Act on 
Television and Radio Operations was being drafted, the Parliament included in the 
preamble a requirement that the licensing authority shall take into consideration ‘the 
existing programme offerings as well as the whole of programming that is formed as a 
result of granting the licences’. However, following the guidelines suggested by Mr 
Mykkänen, ‘only the general lines of programme supply should be considered while the 
operator’s right to decide the content of its programming’ should not be restricted in detail 
(Parliament, 1998: 33). 
In practice, evaluation of each application takes place in two stages. In the first phase, 
economic resources and other preconditions for regular operations of the applicant are 
assessed, as required by law. However, already here its programming plans, in relation to 
its resources, are examined, too. If the candidate squeaks through this examination of 
realism and solidity, the assessment proceeds to the second test where three criteria, 
again set by law, decide: (1) promoting freedom of speech, (2) safeguarding diversity of 
the provision of programming, and (3) serving the needs of special groups of the public 
(Act on Television and Radio Operations, 1998: Section 10). 
For example, when granting licences in December 2006, the COS expressed very 
explicitly how legislation is implemented here. By promoting freedom of speech the 
government meant retarding concentration of the media and introducing independent 
operators to the industry. With special groups of the public it referred to ‘minorities, whose 




Diversity of the provision of programming is composed of the greatest possible 
number of television services offering different content and serving different 
target groups. When comparing applicants with a similar provision, then, 
diversity of content of each applicant shall be assessed. (COS, 2006: 7.) 
In other words, diversity in the Finnish broadcasting policy is a synonym of television 
services that provide the greatest possible number of alternatives to viewers – but also 
differ from each other in terms of programme provision and target group. 
That increasing consumer choice was the number one goal of digitalization in Finland was 
perfectly formulated already in 1996 by the Digitalization Working Group which examined 
the technical and financial conditions of digitalization. According to the group, the 
introduction of new technology would offer ‘more choice to all viewers all over Finland’ 
(Palonen and Kosonen, 1996: 22). This promise stood for an ambition to introduce multi-
channel terrestrial television, similar to urban cable networks, in the vast rural areas of 
Finland. At that time, only 40 per cent of Finnish households were connected to cable or 
possessed a satellite dish. As argued by Brown (2005: 229), this goal reflected a 
protectionist effort to pre-empt further inroads into the Finnish market by foreign satellite 
broadcasters.  
   
Filling the digital airwaves 
The first licensing round 
The first digital licences were granted in June 1999. The MOTC had received a plethora of 
37 applications, 17 of which concerned national television broadcasts (which is our main 
focus here). Three months earlier a ministerial group on communications policy had 
declared that the government would aim at promoting competition among digital television 
services, the diversity of output and the consideration of both language groups. In addition 
to reserving one of the three multiplexes to the public-service YLE, the COS presupposed 
that slots would be granted to the existing domestic channels (MTV3 and Nelonen), thus 
enabling them to continue their operations digitally, and to ‘one European operator as well 
as one or two domestic new entrants’. In particular, the ministerial group deemed it 
important to include one sports channel in the palette (Ero, 1999: 13; see, also, Jääsaari, 
2007: 84-85). In the event, as well as MTV3 and Nelonen, licences were finally granted to 
a sports channel of Suomen Urheilutelevisio Oy (jointly owned by Alma Media/MTV and 
Sanoma Corporation/Helsinki Media Company Oy), a movie channel of Sanoma/Helsinki 
Media Company, and an educational channel of WSOY (the book publishing arm of 
Sanoma Corporation). As all these had corporate connections to either MTV3 or Nelonen, 
in addition an independent domestic entrant, Wellnet Oy, providing personal interest 
information on health,  personal economy, housing, etc., and Canal+, described by the 
government as a European ‘quality entertainment channel’, were selected. The final 
licence went to City-tv, a group owned by Alma Media/MTV, promising a regional service 
on major urban areas. 
11 
 
Of the three digital multiplexes, multiplex A was allocated to YLE while B and C were left 
for commercial channels. Being exempted from the licensing process, YLE had already 
presented its channel scheme in November 1998 its channel scheme, comprising two 
general interest channels (YLE TV1, YLE TV2), a Swedish-speaking channel (YLE FST, 
later YLE FST5), a cultural/educational channel (YLE KOT, later YLE Teema) and a news 
channel (YLE24). This assortment seemed to support YLE’s provision as a public service 
broadcaster with its cultural, educational and informative duties (Aslama et al., 2004a; 
Hujanen, 2004). 
Several factors indicate that the government aimed at increasing competition only 
moderately, holding in mind the structural goal of an ensemble of channels ‘in which firms 
are strong enough to compete with each other viably’ (Ero, 1999: 20). First, as Brown 
(2005: 232) has correctly remarked, the decision favoured the incumbent broadcasters, i.e. 
the public service YLE, owned by the state, and the commercial MTV and Ruutunelonen, 
respectively owned by Alma Media and Sanoma Corporation, the two leading private 
media conglomerates in Finland. For example, the applications of MTV3 and Nelonen 
were approved since they ‘in general have proved to be able to provide the viewers with 
television services of high quality and reliability’ (Ero, 1999: 20). Second, Alma and 
Sanoma were particularly favoured in that only two of the new channels had no 
connections to them. Third, domestic companies, in general, were protected by blocking 
the entry of international media conglomerates, except for Canal+. Fourth, all new licences 
went to special interest channels, which clearly was a relief for the existing general interest 
channels. Finally, five of the six entrants planned to fund their operations by subscription 
instead of advertising, which protected the interests of MTV3 and Nelonen (see, also, 
Aslama et al., 2004b: 118). 
Unfortunately, the final judgement of this beauty contest was vaguely argued. The COS 
simply raised its hands by claiming that ‘there were more applicants that fulfilled the 
requirements than there were channels for allocation’ and deciding to choose, in addition 
to the proposed sports channel, a movie channel and an educational channel, both being 
candidates with no competition. The sports channel required a more explicit comparison 
since, for example, Eurosport was among the applicants but, here, the domestic 
Urheilukanava was triumphant since, as the licensing authority concluded, it would ‘offer a 
more diverse output to the viewers’. In comparing the rest of the domestic candidates, both 
Wellnet and WSOY were appreciated for their ‘interesting content provision’, which 
suggests that, during the first licensing round, the aim was not yet to imitate the 
commercial formulas of cable and satellite operators. Instead, it was assumed that DTV 
could also serve the informational needs of various communities and groups of citizens (cf. 
Kangaspunta, 2006). 
As a whole, the first digital licences represented a considerable plurality of offerings, both 
in terms of sources and programme diversity. If they all materialized, the number of 
channels available terrestrially would have tripled and the assortment, with its five public 
service and two ‘semi-public service’ channels, in addition to two thematic pay services 
and a regional service, would not have accelerated marketization dramatically. Rather, the 
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offering as a whole highlighted division of labour and moderate competition between the 
broadcasters, typical of the ‘old order’ of Finnish broadcasting policy. In other words, the 
first licensing round represented remnants of cultural/moral regulation instead of a 
straightforward economic/commercial approach. 
 
The first extension of Digital Terrestrial Television (DTT) 
However, harsh realities forced broadcasters – and the regulator, too – to compromises. 
Because digital set-top boxes (STBs) were not available at the launch date in August 
2001, there were no viewers nor markets whatsoever. Instead of a big bang, the launch 
was a dud. Four of the channels – Canal+, the movie channel, the educational channel, 
and Wellnet – never started since opportunities for pay-TV were non-existent. Thus, 
instead of the promised 13 channels, the Finns were offered nine, only five of which were 
new. YLE’s channels persisted on the digital airwaves while the two commercial entrants, 
Urheilukanava and SubTV, the successor of City-tv, tried to secure their position by also 
going on analogue cable (Brown, 2005: 236-37). 
The emergence of SubTV is an interesting chapter in the Finnish broadcasting policy. MTV 
had launched, in 2000, a youthful cable channel called TVTV. In June 2001, two months 
before the digital take-off, the company decided to combine its forthcoming regional City-tv 
with TVTV, thus creating SubTV (later Subtv, Sub). SubTV’s youthful schedules provided 
US drama and comedy series, entertainment and reality shows, but no regional profile 
whatsoever. As Brown (2005: 237) notices, it offered ‘a format substantially different from 
the original concept on which the channel was licensed’. Regardless of this, the COS, in 
December 2001, amended its licence from regional to national without declaring the 
licence open for new applications, indicating that the licensing authority was ready to 
accept any reasonable programme offering that might ease the digital disappointment.     
In fact, the second licensing round, completed in March 2003, aimed at filling the gaps that 
had appeared before the launch. However, candidates were fewer, only eight, and their 
programme offerings more conservative than during the first round. Three of the channels 
available went to Canal+ Finland Oy, which now, eventually, was willing to introduce its 
well-established cable/satellite channels (Canal+, Canal+ Blue, Canal+ Film) terrestrially, 
too. The fourth empty slot was granted to a teleshopping channel of Vizor Oy. Here, again, 
the Finnish licensing policy demonstrated its pragmatic flexibility. In autumn 2004, a new 
owner re-profiled the teleshopping service, changing it into a music channel and renaming 
it as The Voice TV. The licensing authority closed its eyes until April 2005 when the 
programming regulations of the channel were amended to include ‘programming targeted 
mainly to young people’ (COS, 2005).  
This second licensing round was the first one in Finland with a great number of 
internationally established applicants, such as Discovery Channel, Animal Planet, MTV 
Nordic, Nickelodeon, Eurosport, etc. However, it was not yet their turn to get foothold of 
the Finnish DTT. Canal+ was the privileged one since the other candidates were not 
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interested in sharing the transmission costs. Few domestic applicants, too, appeared, but 
their promises were considered poorly resourced. An extraordinary feature was that due to 
business secrecy reasons the draft memorandum to the licensing decision was 
pronounced classified. In his statement to the press Mr Ismo Kosonen, a senior officer of 
the MOTC, explained the choices: 
We searched for special interest channels to the assortment since they could 
promote the success of digital television. Experts believe that pay-TV and a movie 
channel could serve as such bait. (HS, 2003: C7) 
In other words, the licensing authority wished not only to ensure that the entrants were well 
resourced and solid but also that they could awake the audience’s dormant interest – and 
here the answer was provided by established satellite channels.  
The creation of a pay-TV market was not left on the responsibility of Canal+ alone. Later 
the same year, MTV3 and Nelonen were allowed to introduce their supplementary 
channels with which they already had experimented. Now that digital STBs with both time-
shift and conditional access properties were finally available and becoming cheaper, MTV3 
MAX in particular, with its sports broadcasts, managed to create consumer demand. In 
summer 2006, Subtv, too, was granted supplementary channels, one for movies (Subtv 
Leffa, later Sub Leffa) and one for children (Subtv Juniori, later Sub Juniori). Nelonen 
chose a different strategy and did not launch its supplementary service JIM until winter 
2007, choosing advertising as its funding base.  
 
 
The break-through of pay-TV 
Brown (2005: 239) criticized the Finnish licensing policy for granting most of the 
commercial digital licences to pay-TV services instead of free-to-air programming. 
However, it was the subscription services that finally served as the main incitement for 
viewers to switch to digital, particularly in non-cabled households (Miettinen, 2007). 
Indeed, if one of the implied purposes of digital conversion was to create a market for pay 
television on the terrestrial network, the goal appears to have been met. 
The growing interest in pay-TV was documented in the third licensing round, completed in 
December 2006. It attracted no less than 19 candidates and more than 30 channel 
propositions. Three domestic applicants were rejected due to their poor financial standing 
but the rest of the candidates were either incumbent broadcasters, such as Nordic 
Broadcasting/MTV, Sanoma/Swelcom/Nelonen and Canal+, or internationally established 
players, familiar from cable and satellite television, such as Euronews, CNN, Nickleodeon, 
Disney, Eurosport, Discovery, National Geographic, Viasat, etc. Since all were interested 
in providing subscription services, the government concluded that granting a licence to any 
of these applicants ‘would not result in a concentration of media insomuch that it would 
endanger freedom of speech’ (COS, 2006: 18). 
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As a result, the explicit deciding factor was the programme provision promised by each 
candidate, or more precisely ‘diversity of programming and its relationship with the whole 
of television broadcasting’ and ‘the way it takes into consideration the needs of the Finnish 
viewers’ (2006: 19). In other words, the MOTC assessed the degree to which each 
candidate was willing to provide Finnish subtitles, commentary in Finnish or, even, 
domestic productions. Here, liberalized structural regulation met with cultural 
protectionism. 
Interestingly, both news channel candidates, CNN and Euronews, were rejected since 
their ‘offerings would have been composed of international news coverage in a foreign 
language’. The government’s decision not to award international news channels was not 
only protectionist but restrictive from the point of source diversity, too. Mildly protectionist 
arguments were used also in granting licences to Nickelodeon’s and Disney’s children’s 
channels. They were allowed to compete with Subtv Juniori since they promised to provide 
‘local content’ and, thus, promote the Finnish audiovisual industry. Also, a music television 
channel MTV Nordic, an affiliate of MTV Networks International (and not to be confused 
with the Swedish-owned Nordic Broadcasting/MTV), was added into the palette since it 
pledged ‘a significant number of programmes presented or subtitled in Finnish’, or even 
‘programmes produced in Finland’. Similarly, Eurosport, an established favourite of cable-
TV viewers, was awarded with a terrestrial licence as it promised to include a Finnish 
language commentary in its all programmes. As the licence of Urheilukanava, the 
domestic sports channel pioneer, was at the same time expanded to include a 
supplementary pay service, Urheilu+kanava, the Finns were now served by no less than 
five DTT channels focusing on sports (COS, 2006: 19-21). 
Somewhat different arguments were used when two documentary channels were selected 
since ‘similar thematic provision of programmes is not available at the moment’ (2006: 20-
21). Either ignoring YLE Teema or wanting to invite commercial competition against it, the 
licensing authority granted the licences to MTV3 Fakta, a domestic channel concept, and 
to Discovery Channel, an established international service, since these promised a remit of 
‘documentaries with a wider topical variety’ than the rest of the candidates. Similarly, 
instead of adding yet another movie channel, the COS decided to grant one licence to a 
channel providing various types of entertainment, ‘in order to increase the diversity of 
programming and to complement the existing offerings’. Of the various applicants, the 
proposition by Sanoma/Swelcom, the parent company of Nelonen, later launched as Kino 
TV, was assessed to be the most diverse as, in addition to European and US series and 
films, it promised to commission domestic programmes too (COS 2006: 13, 20). Although 
justified on grounds of programme diversity, both decisions favoured major domestic 
players.  
Indeed, when these channels were finally on the air in autumn 2007, they played a major 
role in the breakthrough of subscription-based television in Finland. The number of 
subscriptions doubled in 2007 to about 600,000 homes, i.e. every fourth household, with 
the major spur to subscribe pay services being MTV’s decision to reschedule Formula One 
15 
 
to MTV3 MAX. Until November 2006, this great favourite of the viewers was provided free-
to-air on MTV3.  
 
 
Efforts to re-regulate 
Although liberalization has been the leitmotiv of the Finnish digitalization policy, efforts to 
apply a stricter regulation were made too. In 2008, a discussion emerged about the control 
of the broadcasters. According to law, the licensees should provide a report of their 
programming twice a year to Ficora, but it appeared that the reports were never actually 
read. It came under question whether Nelonen or Sub had ever provided current affairs 
programmes, as required in their licences. Unquestionable was that Sub had never 
broadcast news, also required in its licence. This resulted in a promise by Ficora to 
sharpen its supervision. About the same time, MTV, in order to attract female viewers 
better, wished to change the programme content regulations of its MTV3 Fakta 
documentary channel. This time, the licensing authority refused MTV’s request, equating it 
with a new licence which should be declared open for application. 
In 2008, the Swedish TV4, an affiliate of Nordic Broadcasting and a sister company of the 
Finnish MTV, announced an intention to buy the assets of C More Group AB, the owner of 
Canal+. In Finland, the merger created a broadcaster giant that controlled not only two 
major free-to-air channels (MTV3 and Sub) but also altogether 15 subscription channels, 
thus requiring the approval of competition authorities. The fact that the change in 
ownership was not a walkover is indicated by the broad and carefully documented 
assessment of the Finnish Competition Regulation Authority (2008). However, the merger 
was accepted with the rather light condition that the new owner should give up its 
broadcasting rights for the Finnish Ice Hockey League. Also, the regulator (2008: 21-22) 
required that the pay-TV operations of MTV and C More should be kept as separate 
entities. 
 
The effort of the authorities to operate as a referee in the market was also manifested in 
the latest licensing round for digital television frequencies, completed in June 2009. This 
time, the quest was for an operator to broadcast SVT1 and SVT2, the two main channels 
of the Swedish public broadcaster (in 2007, the licence to broadcast SVT Europa, a pay-
TV service providing SVT’s programmes, had been granted to YLE). Although none of the 
nine candidates promised to provide what the MOTC wished, the government decided to 
grant two new licences. One of them went to LIV, a sister channel of JIM, both owned by 
Sanoma Television. Its main rival for the licence was MTV3 AVA, MTV’s lifestyle cable 
channel targeted to women, but LIV came out ahead since it was free-to-air, unlike the 
subscription-based MTV3 AVA. Another argument for providing a channel to Sanoma, 
instead of MTV, was that the former ‘comes up better to the requirement of the law about 
promoting the freedom of speech’, since it controlled fewer channels in the Finnish DTT 




Interestingly, the other licence was not awarded to the Swedish Parsifal International AB 
and its URHOtv, although it had managed to grab the keenly rivalled ice hockey rights. 
This time, the licensing authority decided that ‘there already is an abundance of sports 
channels in the terrestrial network’ (2009: 12) and, instead, decided to favour Family 
Channel Oy, an independent firm owned by a Finnish-Canadian consortium, whose 
SuomiTV with its general interest profile was ‘expected to provide programme contents 
that serve Finnish viewers in a diverse way’ (2009: 13). Although introducing a new entrant 
to the market is welcome, one must ask whether there really is a market for yet another 
advertising-supported general interest channel in Finland. However, once again domestic 
candidates were favoured at the expense of international applicants, such as BBC World 
News, Animal Planet or Eurosport. 
 
Diversity of programming 
Finally, we must consider whether digital conversion managed to promote freedom of 
speech and diversity of programming, as required by law.  
In terms of ownership concentration, the industry is hugely dominated by three major 
players, the state-owned YLE and the two privately owned media conglomerates 
MTV/Nordic Broadcasting and Sanoma Television/Sanoma Corporation. Together, these 
companies control 22 of the 30 channels licensed terrestrially and had, in 2008, a 
combined audience share of 90 per cent (Finnpanel, 2009). Only one of the channels is 
operated by an independent domestic firm, whereas the rest of the assortment is 
composed of internationally established and commercially targeted thematic channels. In 
spite of the multiplied channel capacity, the Finnish DTT market is still concentrated and 
the entry threshold to the market high (cf. Aslama et al., 2004b). On the other hand, the 
public broadcaster YLE is performing well with its 45 per cent share although, in order to 
save money, YLE was forced to shut down its news channel in 2007. 
The channel choice available in autumn 2009 is shown in Table 1 below. The terrestrial 
digital network provided altogether 30 national (or semi-national) channels, of which 12 
were free-to-air and 18 pay services. Among them five can be called general interest 
channels – but even these differ from each other considerably. For example, two thirds of 
YLE TV1’s output consists of informative genres, whereas on Nelonen newscasts and 
information accounted no more than one fifth of its programming (Aslama, 2008: 104-05). 
Five of the channels are targeted to the special groups of the public, i.e. for the Swedish-
speakers or children, whereas the remaining 20 channels are more or less thematic, 
including Sub, with its heavy focus on series and Big Brother type entertainment shows, as 
well as YLE Teema, with its broad concept of a cultural channel, including classic movies, 
series, documentaries, science and educational programmes, etc. No less than five of the 
channels focus on sports, four on movies, three on documentaries, and two on sex. 
Naturally, these channels cannot be claimed duplicates; rather, they represent different 
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dimensions of product differentiation targeted to specific taste groups, thus constituting a 
thematic universe as defined by the industry itself. 
[TABLE 1 TO BE PLACED ABOUT HERE] 
The assortment suggests that Finland has not been able to create an imaginatively original 
concept of a diverse channel choice. Rather, it seems that the licensing authority has been 
forced to conform to the realities of the small market and the mainstream channel 
concepts suggested by the media industry. As a result, the choice offered to the public 
reflects the industry rationale about diversity and consumer choice. The offering as a 
whole is not an offspring of cultural/moral judgement on what the universe of DTT should 
look like but a ‘poor man’s satellite television’ as suggested by commercial television 
companies themselves. On the other hand, one must ask whether it could be otherwise. 
Finland left digitalization at the mercy of the market (Brown, 2005) and the licensing 
authority has, undoubtedly, tried making the best out of the applications. Although some 
applicants did make nonconformist propositions, commercially tested concepts won the 
beauty contests, perhaps since licensing policy emphasized so strongly the economic 
resources and sustainability of the candidates.  
Considering the horizontal diversity of the output, as measured with the Relative Entropy 
Index, data are, unfortunately, available for free-to-air channels only. The results 
presented in Figure 1 depict that, in general, diversity of programming in Finland is very 
high, if calculated across the channels at the level of programme type variety. This 
supports the finding of Aslama (2008: 116-17), according to whom the Finnish television 
system seems not to have suffered much from increased competition. At first, new digital 
channels even tended to increase the breadth of offerings, particularly during prime time, 
but since 2006 the trend has been downwards. In other words, digital conversion managed 
to boost the variety of programme types only temporarily. This supports the result of 
Aslama et al. (2004b: 126-27) that, with the increasing competition, diversity begins to 
suffer. The tougher, or more ruinous, the competition is, the lower the variety provided to 
the viewer (see, also, van der Wurff and van Cuilenburg, 2001). Instead of increasing the 
overall variety, thematic channels have a tendency, due to their focus on certain 
programme types only, to decrease it (Aslama and Lehtinen, 2007: 56-57).  
[FIGURE 1 TO BE PLACED ABOUT HERE] 
The development of Finland’s digitalized television scene also reminds us of the structural 
limits of diversity (Picard, 2000: 183-89). Trying to find content niches that serve 
increasingly fragmented target audiences, channel managers produce variety rather than 
diversity of programming. In other words, viewers are provided with product differentiation, 
i.e. a wide choice between multiple shows of the same genre, while some less popular 





In this article, we have tried to analyze digitalization of television in Finland as a case of a 
liberal turn in media policy. The focus has been on the licensing process and, in particular, 
on the goals set on programming, the implementation of these goals in licensing and the 
resulting diversity provided to the viewer.  
 
From the very beginning, increased programme offerings and programme diversity were 
acknowledged as number one goals of digitalization but, in practice, this came to mean 
promoting consumer choice by increasing the number of channels. Since not many 
realistic alternatives were at hand in the small market of Finland, the licensing authority 
was forced to lean on the mainstream channel concepts proposed by major commercial 
firms. As a result, licenses were almost exclusively granted either to established domestic 
firms, since they were deemed reliable and financially sound, or to well-known 
cable/satellite channels, since they were believed to be able to arouse viewer’s interest. It 
appears that licensing decisions were driven by the necessity to increase, in every 
possible way, the digital penetration as the analogue switch-off was approaching. What 
this meant for programming was that diversity of output did not increase but, rather, was 
biased towards the few programme types favoured by the various thematic channels. 
 
In spite of the disappointing start, digitalization in Finland was a success inasmuch as it 
multiplied the programme offerings and introduced pay-TV to the terrestrial households. At 
the same time, however, many of the original goals were only partially met. First, DTT was 
about protecting domestic industry but, although Finnish firms were favoured whenever 
possible, international players did manage to corner the Finnish market. Even the 
transmission network, earlier considered a ‘national resource’, was sold to a French 
company and MTV, a long-time market leader, to a Swedish firm. Second, Finland wished 
to avoid ‘digitalization via satellite’ but, paradoxically, the very same international channel 
concepts which Finland wanted to challenge in fact, thanks to licensing decisions, gained a 
firm foothold in the digital airwaves. 
 
The analysis also pointed to some peculiarities of the Finnish broadcasting policy, most 
notably the ‘flexibility’ applied when SubTV and The Voice TV re-profiled their schedules 
with a substantially different programme output compared to the original concept defined in 
their licences. Since then both policy and the competitive situation have changed, as was 
indicated by MTV’s recent effort to change the provision of its documentary channel. 
However, and in alignment with the new role of the state as a liberal referee of the market, 
the decision was not based on cultural/moral arguments but on competition rules. In 
general, the MOTC has stayed away from issuing too specific directives on broadcast 
programming, since it considered this to be a matter for the broadcasters. 
 
In conclusion, Finland does not (yet) represent a pure market model in broadcasting since 
the public broadcaster still has strong bonds with the political system and is well protected 
and privileged. However, digital television has brought about a major leap towards the 
liberal model: it has transformed broadcasting, as Hallin and Mancini (2004: 252) put it, 
‘from a political and cultural institution in which market forces played a minimal role into an 
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industry in which they are central’. DTT in Finland meant more television – not necessarily 
more diverse television. Licensing policy has relied increasingly on economic/commercial 
rationale, instead of cultural/moral regulation. The findings of the present analysis support 
the claim by Karppinen (2005: 34) that ‘increased alternatives and freedom of choice have 
become ends in themselves, on the basis of which licences for electronic media have, 
without exception, been justified’. They also are in congruence with the conclusion of 
Jääsaari (2007) that, in the end, digitalization promoted the marketization of television. The 
new paradigm of broadcasting policy, as suggested by Mr Jouni Mykkänen 15 years ago, 
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Table 1: Channel choice in the Finnish DTT, 2009 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Funding General interest Thematic  Special groups 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Free-to-air, YLE TV1   YLE Teema (culture) YLE FST5 (Swedish) 
public YLE TV2  
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Free-to-air, MTV3  Sub (entertainment)  
advertising Nelonen  JIM (light documentary) 
 SuomiTV  LIV (lifestyle)    
   Urheilukanava (sports) 
   The Voice (entertainment) 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Subscription   Urheilu+kanava (sports) Sub Juniori (children) 
   Canal+ Sport 1 (sports) Disney Channel (children) 
   Canal+ Sport 2 (sports) Nickleodeon (children) 
   Eurosport (sports) SVT Europa (Swedish) 
   MTV3 MAX (sports) 
   MTV3 Fakta (documentary) 
   Discovery (documentary) 
   Sub Leffa (movies) 
   Canal+ First (movies) 
   Canal+ Hits (movies) 
   Kino TV (movies, series) 
   MTV Nordic (music) 
   Canal69 (sex) 
   Digiviihde (sex) 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 








Source: Calculated from the annual research reports, commissioned by the MOTC (see, e.g., Aslama and 
Lehtinen, 2009). In these studies, a 13-category classification of programming is used: (1) news, (2) current 
affairs, (3) information and documentary, (4) cultural programming, (5) personal interest programme, (6) 
education, (7) domestic drama, (8) foreign drama, (9) movie, (10) entertainment, (11) sports, (12) children’s 
programme, and (13) other programmes. DTT channels are included in the figures from 2002 onwards. 
 
Note: The Relative Entropy Index expresses how varied and balanced programme output is across the 
channels. The higher the figure, the higher the diversity, i.e. viewer’s probability to see different programme 
types on television. Relative entropy H varies between 0 and 1, with 0 expressing minimum diversity (all 
content in one programme category) and 1 expressing maximum diversity (all categories equally large). More 
about the measure, see, e.g., Hellman (2001) and van Cuilenburg (2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
